The assumption that Iberian and CEE countries may have comparable media systems is strengthened by the similarities in these nations' political past and present. It takes just a quick look at the political system correlates of the Mediterranean model to appreciate the similarities between CEE countries and Southern European new democracies such as Portugal, Spain, and even Greece. However, an analysis of specific media system characteristics offers a more complex picture. A series of case studies and essays published in 2010 5 and 2012 6 argue that the shift from a strictly defined communist model to post-communist models might have represented a mirroring of some European models or the creation of hybrids mixing the ideal-types proposed by Hallin and Mancini. In order to fully understand the path followed by each CEE media system, a relevant step is to test the most plausible hypothesis: mediterraneanization. Since this process does not necessarily mean a duplication of the Italian media system, other benchmarks are necessary.
The goal of this chapter is therefore to present Portugal and Spain as relevant benchmarks for the analysis of the relationship between media and politics in the CEE new democracies. Portugal and Spain are addressed separately, despite the fact that they are characterized as very similar systems within the polarized pluralistic model: in practice, an
Iberian model. I argue that, despite sharing several features, these nations constitute different examples of the polarized pluralistic media system model. Unquestionably, these two neighbouring countries display several similarities, which are certainly due to the fact that they have followed the same pattern of political events over the last century: a short and turbulent experience of democratic republicanism, the implementation of authoritarian regimes that lasted several decades, an official absence from the Second World War, and a bloody war that caused the death of many and left deep scars in the society (the 1936-1939 that are related to these factors. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the original theoretical model and the approach taken here. In this chapter, I explore patterns of media political bias instead of political parallelism, since the former may be more suitable for a comparison between the two geographical extremes of the EU and more applicable to the CEE countries. This is because the concept of political parallelism rests on the existence of a relatively stable party system that the media outlets mirror more or less perfectly. This is the case in Portugal and Spain, but not in the CEE countries, where party system fluidity is a relevant pattern.
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The chapter is organized as follows. In the next four subsections, the Iberian countries are characterized in terms of press market development, state intervention in the media, political bias, and journalist professionalization. Within each subsection, an array of comparable data is used to place Portugal and Spain in the European landscape; then, the similarities and differences with CEE countries are discussed, and the relevance and impact of different levels of development, state intervention, political bias, and journalist professionalization are discussed. The concluding section of this chapter presents the main insights that the Portuguese and Spanish cases may offer to the students of CEE media systems. Portuguese citizens believe that drawing the attention of the media to a specific subject is an effective form of political participation. 17 However, it is reasonable to assume that most citizens were thinking about the role and power of the television instead of the press, considering the relevance that television has in the Portuguese media landscape and the low levels of newspaper circulation. Also, although TV is seen as a means of vertical communication, this communication is often done in a sensationalistic fashion (through the use of human interest and dramatic frames), which often contributes to the erosion of trust in the political realm.
Variety of Media Systems in Third-Wave Democracies
It can also be argued that a small market also poses financial challenges to the long-term survival of newspapers, and weakens their capacity to resist political and economic pressures by eroding their autonomy. In 2009, the relationship between the size of the press market and an index of journalistic professionalization in Europe (see 'Journalist
Professionalization') was very strong, 18 which suggests that journalists are more autonomous and devoted to the public service ideal in wider markets. and LaSexta (2006), is also a relevant competitor in the Spanish market. In Portugal, RTP lost the battle for audiences in the mid-1990s, mostly due to the competitive, fresh, and modern style adopted by SIC and, later, by TVI. In 2009, the two public channels reached less than 30 per cent of audience share, while the two private broadcasters were able to attract more than half of the TV-watching citizens. In Spain, the outlook is similar (Table 15 .1), even though the two TVE channels had to compete with a wider set of private broadcasters.
The advent of commercial TV happened more or less at the same time in the Iberian Peninsula and CEE countries (i.e., around 1990). While in most CEE countries the first private broadcasters started to operate right after the fall of the communist regimes, in Portugal and Spain the liberalization of the television sector (as well as the privatization of some newspapers) only happened fifteen years after the democratic breakthrough. than commercial TV channels, thereby providing a public service to the citizenry. In the Iberian Peninsula, airtime dedicated to news and information is indeed higher in public than in private channels. In the case of Portugal, in 2007 there was an average of 6 per cent of airtime dedicated to news in commercial channels and 18 per cent in public channels. In Spain, the figures are 16 per cent for private broadcasters and 26 per cent for the public broadcasting service. 23 However, despite the fact that the Portuguese public channels broadcast more news, experts believe that RTP does not offer more political news, a wider range of programming, or more in-depth, accurate, and trustworthy information than the commercial broadcasters. 24 In Spain, commercial channels do offer less quality information than the TVE channels. 25 Consequently, the strong commercialization of the TV market looks more hazardous in Spain than in Portugal.
The degree to which a public broadcaster offers more news and high-quality information to their audience may depend on how dependent it is on (p.238) advertisement revenues. In
Variety of Media Systems in Third-Wave Democracies other words, a public channel that receives a substantial proportion of its money from the state may feel less inclined to turn to infotainment and cut the airtime devoted to hard news, since its survival depends less on audience shares than on the quality of the public service provided. However, there are no significant differences between these two countries: the Portuguese RTP gets 77 per cent of its revenues from the state, while TVE needs advertisement to provide for a third of its expenses. 26 The fact that the public broadcasters get considerable amounts of funding from the state may result in a weaker tendency to produce low-quality content, but the deep economic crisis in the Iberian Peninsula menaces this model of public TV funding. The public broadcasters in Spain and Portugal are under serious threat, especially after the Greek public broadcasting service shutdown in July 2013. For instance, following government directions, the current RTP administration is implementing a series of measures aimed at restructuring the public broadcasting system and substantially cutting its costs, namely by means of staff reduction. Interestingly enough, except for Poland, Lithuania, and Slovenia, the CEE public broadcasters get more than fourfifths of their funds from the State. 27 As we have seen above, most of these broadcasters register considerably lower levels of audience share, which means that their capability to attract advertisement funds is weak and their sole survival is dependent on the will of the political actors.
A third form of state intervention concerns regulation. In order to grasp this aspect of European media systems, I use the Freedom House index of legal threats to press freedom, which is based on an examination of the laws and regulations that may influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. 28 Legal constraints are rather weak in political parallelism, both because the levels of bias are low and because the public channels are the most biased, its political leaning depending on which party is the incumbent. Survey data seems to confirm these trends: 40 to 50 per cent of Portuguese do not have an opinion on media plurality, which may be understood as the absence of blatant political leanings. Moreover, those who had an opinion considered private broadcasters to be less biased than the public broadcaster. 40 In Spain, political bias is believed to be fairly strong, and the levels of press-party parallelism were so significant that the expression Parlamento de Papel (Parliament of Paper) was used in reference to the Spanish newspaper market. 41 Spanish newspapers cater to particular political audiences. Several considerations are important concerning specific outlets. First, while about a third of the Portuguese experts were unable to express an opinion about media-party relationships, this task seems to have been much easier for the Spanish experts. Second, the most relevant Spanish newspapers and private broadcasters display a moderate to high level of political bias. Third, while in the case of Portugal the public broadcaster was considered to be the most biased outlet due to its incumbent party liaisons, in Spain the most relevant newspapers and commercial channels are the outlets with the strongest levels of political bias. 42 Levels of political partiality of the most important outlets in the CEE countries vary considerably, with the Baltic countries displaying low to moderate levels of media partisanship, the public broadcasters in Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia being more biased than the commercial television, and the degree of internal diversity or neutrality in Hungarian and Romanian outlets varying considerably, independently of their nature (printed vs audiovisual) or ownership (public vs private).
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Slovakia and Portugal share a relevant feature: a trend towards stronger levels of political bias in the public channels vis-à-vis their private counterparts, even if this trend is much stronger in the former than in the latter. Interestingly enough, in CEE countries, levels of political bias are believed to be stronger within locally owned mass media, which are not only the object, but also the subject of political instrumentalization
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Page 15 and corruption. 44 One of the key features of specific CEE media systems, such as (p.241) those of Bulgaria or Romania, where ownership results in distorted media markets, is the fact that media are owned and run for reasons other than profit or public service, a pattern that has been associated with the departure of foreign investors (along with the professional standards that they defended) and the rise of local moguls who instrumentalize their media outlets. 45 Journalist Professionalization
This dimension refers to the degree to which journalists acknowledge and comply with norms of ethics and quality in their work. Journalist professionalization matters because it leads, at least theoretically, to higher standards of information quality, hence benefiting citizens who need political information in order to make their decisions. Levels of journalist professionalization 46 vary considerably in Europe.
On an eleven-point scale, the average level of journalist professionalization according to experts is 4.9, meaning that overall levels of journalism professionalization in Europe are not particularly high. Nevertheless, there is a substantial difference between the situation in the EU Scandinavian countries (where the levels of professionalization are very high) and the patterns observed for Italy and several CEE nations (where the experts were pessimistic about the condition of journalism as a profession). Also, journalist professionalization seems to be stronger in Portugal than in Spain (Figure 15 .2).
However, the relative superiority of Portugal vis-à-vis Spain and other countries does not mitigate the fact that, on average, the Portuguese journalists are poorly professionalized. A study of journalists in Portugal points out several potential causes for this state of affairs, some of them related to the size of the market and the precarious situation of younger workers. 47 This is actually a common feature of the Iberian countries. For instance, a few years ago, there were about 32,000 students of journalism in Spain. 48 In an underdeveloped press market, this means that the demand for this kind of profession is much lower than the supply, and that those who need to work are more willing to accept precarious
Page 16 Professionalization leads to fewer strains on freedom of press: in Europe, journalist professionalization is strongly and negatively associated with legal, political, and economic threats to press freedom. 52 As we have seen above, in 2009 political threats to press freedom were not a fundamental problem in Portugal, but in Spain the political constraints on the work of journalists were particularly strong. In the EU26 group, there were only two other countries where press freedom was being equally or more threatened by political actors than in Spain: Greece and
Romania. In 2006, the Madrid Association of the Press
Click to view larger approved a declaration stating that Spanish journalists were facing a series of problems endangering press freedom and degrading journalists as professionals. Media editors were accused of using the media for propaganda purposes serving powerful people or political parties, and licences were arguably being granted with criteria of ideological affinity or special interests. Press freedom, despite being guaranteed by the Constitution, is not always accepted by public authorities, especially when terrorism or the Spanish royal family are involved. 53 In terms of public service and the media as watchdog paradigm, journalists from both sides of the frontier face challenges and, to some extent, a degradation of their role. In Portugal, survey data shows that the media is not seen by the public as an agent of change, but as a privileged actor that can retrieve information about the backstage of the political world and offer it to the citizens and democratic institutions that have the means to act. In 2011, more than two-thirds of the citizens considered that allowing the media greater access to the reasons and criteria surrounding the government decision-making process is an effective form of vertical accountability (i.e. a way by which the citizens can actually monitor their elected representatives), even if only a handful actually believed that the media are able to stop abuses from the government. 55 Conversely, in Spain, the media capacity to control abusive practices by the government is believed to be much stronger: on a scale from 1 to 5, the media get 3.5, the same score granted to the Constitutional Court. 
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was not to make an in-depth, comprehensive comparative analysis of the media systems in the Iberian Peninsula and Central and Eastern Europe, but rather to propose an operational comparative framework and to use it in order to describe relevant patterns and trends in the Iberian markets, offering the Portuguese and Spanish cases as benchmarks for the analysis of CEE media systems. The chapter tries therefore to set the ground for comparative studies of media systems from the geographical extremes of the European Union, by identifying interesting patterns to be explored by subsequent research.
One of the most interesting general conclusions to be drawn from this chapter is that being part of a geographical entity and sharing several historical, political, economic, and cultural features may not result in similar media systems being implemented. In fact, the Portuguese and Spanish media systems are more different that one would expect. Despite being strongly influenced by it, the development of the media markets is not completely dependent on historical and political legacies, but can be shaped by the actors that interact with the media system or work within its frontiers. For the students of CEE media systems, the idea that the historical political background is but one factor within the array of dimensions shaping media system developments may encourage them to focus even more on the identification of critical junctures taking place in those countries after 1989.
(p.244) Several other patterns are worth underlining. First, low levels of press market development do not always result in threats to media freedom due to a weaker resilience to pressures from political or economic actors. In the case of Portugal, political and economic threats to press freedom are rather low despite the underdevelopment of its press market. Journalist professionalization and low levels of party polarization may be an asset here. Second, commercialization does result in weaker levels of news and quality information being offered to the audience. This is especially worrying in new democracies where the televised media is probably the most important, if not the only, source of political information (2.) A media system is defined as a network of mass media outlets-television channels, press outlets (newspapers and magazines), radio, and internet-that exist, interact, and compete in a given geographical area, in a given time period, serving the same population, using the same language and cultural codes, following the same legal framework, and facing identical political, economic, and social constraints. 
